1. |
Corrigendum to “Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models” [J. Econ. Theory 195 (2021) 105260] (Peer-reviewed) Ignacio Esponda, Demian Pouzo, Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.204,pp.105513 2022.9
|
2. |
Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed) Ignacio Esponda, Demian Pouzo, Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.195 2021.7
|
3. |
Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed) Takuo Sugaya, Yuichi Yamamoto
Theoretical Economics Vol.15,No.3,pp.1175-1219 2020.1
|
4. |
Stochastic Games with Hidden States (Peer-reviewed) Yuichi Yamamoto
Theoretical Economics Vol.14,No.3,pp.1115-1167 2019.7
|
5. |
Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games (Peer-reviewed) Yuichi Yamamoto
Review of Economic Studies Vol.81,No.1,pp.473-500 2014.1
|
6. |
Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under Conditional Indepen- dence (Peer-reviewed) Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.147,No.5,pp.1998-2027 2012.9
|
7. |
Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed) Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.146,No.5,pp.1733-1769 2011.9
|
8. |
The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed) Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.146,No.4,pp.1664-1683 2011.7
|
9. |
Repeated Games where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure are Unknown (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed) Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto
Econometrica Vol.78,No.5,pp.1673-1710 2010.9
|
10. |
The Use of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games (Peer-reviewed) Yuichi Yamamoto
International Journal of Game Theory Vol.39,No.3,pp.431-443 2010.7
|
11. |
A Limit Characterization of Belief-Free Equilibrium Payoffs in Repeated Games (Peer-reviewed) Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.144,No.2,pp.802-824 2009.3
|
12. |
Efficiency Results in N Player Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (Peer-reviewed) Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.135,No.1,pp.382-413 2007.7
|
No.
|
Name of subject/Conference Name
|
Year
|
Site
|
1. |
Unawareness and Equlibrium Stability in Misspecified Learning(28th DC Conference)
|
Holding date :
Presentation date :
2022.10.14 |
|
2. |
Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players: First-Order Misspecification and Higher-Order Misspecification(September Workshop on Economics at Otaru)
|
Holding date :
Presentation date :
2021.10.31 |
|
3. |
Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players(Econometric Society European Meeting 2021)
|
Holding date :
Presentation date :
2021.8.25 |
|
4. |
Recent developments on misspecified Bayesian learning(日本経済学会2020年度秋季大会)
|
Holding date :
Presentation date :
2020.10.10 |
オンライン(立正大学) |
5. |
Asymptotic Behavior of Bayesian Learners with Model Misspecification(6th Decision Theory Workshop)
|
Holding date :
Presentation date :
2019.10.26 |
Hitotsubashi University |
6. |
Stable Berk-Nash Equilibrium(2019 Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference)
|
Holding date :
Presentation date :
2019.4.26 |
Penn Stater Hotel and Conference Center |