Institute of Economic Research,Research Division of Theories in Economics and Statistics
YAMAMOTO Yuichi

Books and Other Publications

1. 現代経済学の潮流
宇井, 貴志, 加納, 隆, 土居, 潤子, 西山, 慶彦 (Contributor)
東洋経済新報社 2021.3 (ISBN : 9784492315316)
2. ベイズ学習とバイアス―自信過剰な人は得をするか?
山本 裕一 (Sole author)
三菱経済研究所 2021.3

Papers

1. Corrigendum to “Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models” [J. Econ. Theory 195 (2021) 105260] (Peer-reviewed)
Ignacio Esponda, Demian Pouzo, Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.204,pp.105513 2022.9
doi
2. Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed)
Ignacio Esponda, Demian Pouzo, Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.195 2021.7
doi
3. Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed)
Takuo Sugaya, Yuichi Yamamoto
Theoretical Economics Vol.15,No.3,pp.1175-1219 2020.1
doi
4. Stochastic Games with Hidden States (Peer-reviewed)
Yuichi Yamamoto
Theoretical Economics Vol.14,No.3,pp.1115-1167 2019.7
Link
5. Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games (Peer-reviewed)
Yuichi Yamamoto
Review of Economic Studies Vol.81,No.1,pp.473-500 2014.1
doi
6. Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under Conditional Indepen- dence (Peer-reviewed)
Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.147,No.5,pp.1998-2027 2012.9
doi
7. Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed)
Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.146,No.5,pp.1733-1769 2011.9
doi
8. The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed)
Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.146,No.4,pp.1664-1683 2011.7
doi
9. Repeated Games where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure are Unknown (jointly worked) (Peer-reviewed)
Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto
Econometrica Vol.78,No.5,pp.1673-1710 2010.9
doi
10. The Use of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games (Peer-reviewed)
Yuichi Yamamoto
International Journal of Game Theory Vol.39,No.3,pp.431-443 2010.7
Link
11. A Limit Characterization of Belief-Free Equilibrium Payoffs in Repeated Games (Peer-reviewed)
Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.144,No.2,pp.802-824 2009.3
doi
12. Efficiency Results in N Player Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (Peer-reviewed)
Yuichi Yamamoto
Journal of Economic Theory Vol.135,No.1,pp.382-413 2007.7
doi

▼display all

Presentations

No. Name of subject/Conference Name Year Site
1. Unawareness and Equlibrium Stability in Misspecified Learning(28th DC Conference)
Holding date :
Presentation date : 2022.10.14
2. Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players: First-Order Misspecification and Higher-Order Misspecification(September Workshop on Economics at Otaru)
Holding date :
Presentation date : 2021.10.31
3. Misspecified Bayesian Learning by Strategic Players(Econometric Society European Meeting 2021)
Holding date :
Presentation date : 2021.8.25
4. Recent developments on misspecified Bayesian learning(日本経済学会2020年度秋季大会)
Link
Holding date :
Presentation date : 2020.10.10
オンライン(立正大学)
5. Asymptotic Behavior of Bayesian Learners with Model Misspecification(6th Decision Theory Workshop)
Holding date :
Presentation date : 2019.10.26
Hitotsubashi University
6. Stable Berk-Nash Equilibrium(2019 Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference)
Holding date :
Presentation date : 2019.4.26
Penn Stater Hotel and Conference Center

▼display all

Awards

No. Award name Year
1. Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2023

Research Projects

No. Research subject Research item(Awarding organization, System name) Year
1. Bayesian Learning with Model Misspecification
Link
Scientific Research (B)
( Awarding organization: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science System name: Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research )
2020.4 - 2025.3
2. Institutional Design for Digital Economy
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
( Awarding organization: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science System name: Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research )
2020.4 - 2024.3